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Abstract
In this paper, I focus on two aspects of central banking – ﬂexibility and transparency –
that have been affected by monetary policy debates over the past twenty years. Because
criticism of inﬂation targeting, at least in the United States, often focuses on the claim
that an inﬂation targeting central bank may ignore real economic ﬂuctuations, I direct my
comments to the role real objectives play in the design of optimal monetary policy. That
is, I focus on how ﬂexible the central bank should be. I argue that, while the recent trend
in the academic literature to view central bank objectives as derived from the welfare of
the representative agent can be insightful, this perspective is not the only one for thinking
about the goals assigned to the central bank. There are reasons why the objectives of a
central bank should, potentially, deviate from social welfare, and I will focus on two such
reasons; one related to imperfect monitoring and accountability, the other arising from
asymmetric information.
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Nontechnical Summary
This paper focuses on two aspects of central banking – ﬂexibility and transparency – that have
been affected by monetary policy debates over the past twenty years. Because criticism of
inﬂation targeting, at least in the United States, often focuses on the claim that an inﬂation
targeting central bank may ignore real economic ﬂuctuations, I direct my comments to the role
real objectives play in the design of optimal monetary policy. That is, I focus on how ﬂexible
the central bank should be.
I will argue that, while the recent trend in the academic literature to view central bank objectives
as derived from the welfare of the representative agent can be insightful, this perspective is not
the only one for thinking about the goals assigned to the central bank. There are reasons why
the objectives of a central bank should, potentially, deviate from social welfare, and I will focus
on two such reasons; one related to imperfect monitoring and accountability, the other arising
from asymmetric information.
The past twenty-ﬁve years have seen tremendous changes in the practice of monetary policy,
both in the institutional frameworks within which policy is conducted and in the manner in
which it is implemented. While modern central banks are committed to maintaining low and
stableinﬂation, politicalpressures, uncertainty, measurementproblemsofbothaconceptualand
empirical nature, and the lack of formal commitment mechanisms all suggest a reoccurrence of
inﬂation is always possible.
Using a simple model of asymmetric information, I found that the desirability of transparency
depended on the nature of the underlying shocks, but whether transparent or not, a conservative
central banker (i.e., one who operates with less ﬂexibility) improved welfare by offsetting some
of the distortion created by asymmetric information.
Of course, while imperfect monitoring and asymmetric information may affect how ﬂexible a
central bank should be, it is important to keep in mind that my discussion presumed that the
most important task of a central bank – providing a nominal anchor – was being met.Inﬂation Targeting and the Role of Real Objectives 3
1. Introduction
In this paper, I will focus on two aspects of central banking – ﬂexibility and transparency – that
have been affected by monetary policy debates over the past twenty years. By ﬂexibility, I refer
to the ways in which a central bank responds to objectives other than inﬂation. I have in mind
here objectives such as stabilizing the real economy; hence, the role of real objectives in my
title. My usage of ﬂexibility is, therefore, what is meant when referring to ﬂexible, as opposed
to strict, inﬂation targeting. I will review what theory has to tell us about how ﬂexible a central
bank should be and the ways in which optimal ﬂexibility is affected by how transparent the
central bank chooses to be.
Inﬂation targeting is widely accepted as best practice for a modern central bank today, so my
discussion will, by and large, take for granted that we are dealing with an inﬂation targeting
monetary authority. While any monetary policy that credibly establishes a nominal anchor can
sufﬁce to control inﬂation, an announced inﬂation target is the current anchor of choice. Be-
cause criticism of inﬂation targeting, at least in the United States, often focuses on the claim that
an inﬂation targeting central bank may ignore real economic ﬂuctuations, I direct my comments
to the role real objectives play in the design of optimal monetary policy. That is, I focus on how
ﬂexible the central bank should be.
I will argue that, while the recent trend in the academic literature to view central bank objectives
as derived from the welfare of the representative agent can be insightful, this perspective is not
the only one for thinking about the goals assigned to the central bank. There are reasons why
the objectives of a central bank should, potentially, deviate from social welfare, and I will focus
on two such reasons; one related to imperfect monitoring and accountability, the other arising
from asymmetric information.
Before getting to these topics, I ﬁrst focus on what has been the most profound change in central
banking over the past twenty years – the increase in central bank independence.
2. Central Bank Independence
Dating from the passage of the 1989 Reserve Bank Act of New Zealand, the past twenty years
have seen a major evolution in monetary policy thinking, an evolution that has stressed the
importance of the institutional structure within which policy decisions are made.1 A primary
consequence of this emphasis on institutional structures is that many countries have undergone
reforms aimed at increasing the degree of independence exercised by their central banks. These
reforms have affected central banks in developed economies and in developing economies.2
Empirical studies that discovered an inverse relationship between central bank independence
and inﬂation during the 1970s and 1980s (see Cukierman 1992 and the references he cites)
supported the notion that political interference in the conduct of monetary policy produced an
inﬂationary bias. Perhaps more important, however, for the wide acceptance of the desirability
of independence was the ﬁnding that central bank independence was not associated with greater
real volatility or lower economic growth (Alesina and Summers 1993).
1 I had the good fortune to spend part of 1990 in New Zealand as a Fulbright Research Scholar at the New Zealand
Institute for Economic Research, then headed by Alan Bollard who is now the Governor of the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand.
2 See Cukierman (2006) for a discussion of the evolution of central bank independence.4 Carl E. Walsh
Some quantitative evidence on the trend towards increased central bank independence is pro-
vided by Arnone, Laurens, and Segalotto (2006b), who have recently updated an earlier 1991
index of central bank independence due to Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991). Included
in their sample are 18 developed economies, 9 emerging market economies, and 4 developing
economies. Figure 1 (in Appendix) plots the change in central bank independence, as measured
by the standardized index constructed by Arnone, Laurens, and Segalotto (2006b, Appendix,
Table 10), against the country’s level of central bank independence in 1991-92. The scatter plot
provides clear evidence of convergence among these countries.3 Countries with lower levels of
central bank independence in the original index have tended to experience the largest increases
in independence over the intervening period.
Central bank independence has several dimensions (Cukierman 1992, Fischer and Debelle
1994). Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini distinguished between political independence and
economic independence. Figure 2 shows, for the 18 developed economies, the changes in these
two components of independence. For many of them, the major increase in central bank in-
dependence was associated with the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the
transfer of monetary policy authority from national central banks to the European Central Bank
(ECB). Not surprisingly, countries such as Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Portugal,
and Spain show large increases in political independence due to their membership in the EMU.4
While the trend has clearly been towards increased independence along both dimensions, not
all countries have experienced positive changes. Political independence has fallen for the Re-
serve Bank of Australia and the Bank of Canada, while the shift of policy authority from the
Bundesbank to the ECB reduced economic independence in Germany.5
Central bank independence gained popularity as a solution to the high average inﬂation rates of
the 1970s and 1980s. Certainly average rates of inﬂation have fallen over the past twenty years,
ﬁrst among developed economies and then among developing economies. Figure 3 shows that
average inﬂation began to drop in the 1980s among industrial economies but fell signiﬁcantly
among developing countries only in the past ten years. How much of this success in bringing
down inﬂation should be attributed directly to central bank independence is still an open issue of
debate. Campillo and Miron (1997) argued that after controlling for other variables,6 they ﬁnd
no evidence that the degree of central bank independence mattered. Temple (1998) suggested
that this result was heavily inﬂuenced by the presence of Iceland in the sample, and that once
this outlier is removed, central bank independence is signiﬁcantly and negatively related to
average inﬂation. More recently, Cecchetti, Hooper, Kasman, Schoenholtz, and Watson (2007)
have argued that, at least for the G-7 nations, inﬂation was brought under control before the
advent of reforms designed to increase central bank independence.
Figure 4 plots the change in average inﬂation between 1970-79 and 1998-2005 against the
change in central bank independence between 1991-92 and 2003 as measured by Arnone, Lau-
rens, and Segalotto (2006b). The negative relationship suggests that those countries experi-
3 The correlation between the change and the 1991-92 level is ¡0:64.
4 Amongthedevelopedeconomies, increasesinpoliticalandeconomicindependencehavegenerallygonetogether,
with the correlation between the change in the two equal to 0:36.
5 The Reserve Bank of Australia and the Bank of Canada receive a lower score on political independence according
to ALS because of a weakening of their relative position in the case of a conﬂict with the government. The
Bundesbank receives a lower economic independence score because of reduced autonomy in setting the discount
rate.
6 Such as a measure of political instability, imports to GDP, income, income per capita, the debt to GDP ratio, and
the exchange rate regime.Inﬂation Targeting and the Role of Real Objectives 5
encing the largest increases in central bank independence also enjoyed the biggest declines in
inﬂation. Regressing the change in inﬂation on the change in central bank independence yields a
large and statistically signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient (see row 1, Table 1). To give some context
to the magnitude of the coefﬁcient estimate, it implies that the change in the Bank of England’s
independence would account for just under 3 percentage points of the 10 percentage point drop
in average UK inﬂation over this period. Expressed alternatively, inﬂation in the UK declined
by 10:1% from 1970-79 to 1998-2005, while inﬂation in the US fell by 4:6%; the increase in
the independence of the Bank of England can account for just over half of this difference.
Table 1: Change in inﬂation and central bank independence
(Developed economies)
constant cbi02 ¡ cbi91 ¼70¡79 R2






















* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
But does this really provide any evidence that central bank reforms have mattered? Once one
controls for a country’s average inﬂation in the earlier period, any impact of central bank reform
disappears (see row 2, Table 1). Countries with high inﬂation in the 1970-79 period experienced
the biggest declines in inﬂation, with no explanatory power attributed to changes in central
bank independence. Figure 5 plots the change in central bank independence for the developed
economies against the inﬂation rate during 1970-79, both variables expressed relative to their
means. The strong positive association suggests that causality might have run not from central
bank independence to inﬂation but the other way. Countries that experienced relatively high
inﬂation in the 1970s tended to implement reforms that produced the largest gains in central
bank independence.
Asnotedearlier, Cecchettiet-al. arguethatcentralbankreformamongthedevelopedeconomies
occurred after the decline in inﬂation. Most likely, the factors that led to policy actions to
reduce inﬂation also supported the reform of central banks as a means of protecting against
the recurrence of inﬂation. Thus, even if central bank reforms were directly responsible for
only a small part of the reduction in inﬂation, the more interesting and important question is
whether, given that we are in a post-reform era, the reforms of the 1990s are sufﬁcient to ensure
high inﬂation will not again become a problem. The relatively mild inﬂationary consequences
of oil price increases in recent years, and the stability of inﬂation expectations, suggests the
post-central bank reform era is a less inﬂationary one than the pre-reform era, but the degree to
which central bank independence is responsible for this is an open question.
To summarize this discussion of central bank independence, inﬂation was reduced prior to the
major central bank reforms among developed economies, the sample of countries on which the
primary empirical support for a relationship between the two was based. It is difﬁcult, therefore,6 Carl E. Walsh
to attribute the drop in inﬂation to the adoption of central bank independence. The reforms are
bestseenasaformofinsurance, designedtoreducethechancesofareturntohighinﬂation. The
relatively muted inﬂationary consequences of oil price increases in recent years offers some, but
limited, evidence that the reforms have worked.
3. Flexible Inﬂation Targeting
Once a central bank has its independence, what should it do? Mervyn King has stated that
central banking institutions “are set up explicitly to exercise a degree of discretion, ‘constrained
discretion,’ subject to the broad objective of price stability.” (King (2004, p. 5) How does a
central bank operate with constrained discretion?
The answer for many central banks is reﬂected in the wide-spread adoption of inﬂation tar-
geting. In contrast to independence, which reﬂects the institutional structure that governs the
relationship between the central bank and the government, inﬂation targeting is primarily an
implementation strategy for monetary policy. Figure 6 shows how the number of formal inﬂa-
tion targeters has grown since New Zealand became the ﬁrst in 1990. While the initial adopters
were all industrial economies, the last ten years has seen thirteen emerging market economies
join the ranks of the inﬂation targeters.
Andy Rose has offered an interesting interpretation of inﬂation targeting as the emerging new
international monetary system, one that contrasts signiﬁcantly with the Bretton Woods system.
Table 2, taken from Rose (2006), lists several characteristics of both the Bretton Woods and
the current inﬂation targeting regimes. The contrast between the two systems has led Rose to
describe inﬂation targeting as Bretton Woods reversed. Of particular relevance is the associa-
tion of inﬂation targeting with independent but accountable central banks, their high degree of
transparency, and the alignment of inﬂation targeting with current academic research.Inﬂation Targeting and the Role of Real Objectives 7
Table 2: Rose’s comparison of Bretton Woods and Inﬂation Targeting (Rose 2006)
Bretton Woods Inﬂation Targeting
1 Regime durability Low High
2 Exchange rate regime Fixed Floating
3 Focus of monetary policy Partly international Wholly domestic
4 Intermediate target Exchange rate None/Inﬂation forecast
5 Capital mobility Controlled Relatively unrestricted
6 Current acc. imbalances Limited High
7 System design Planned Unplanned
8 International cooperation Necessary Not required
9 Role of IMF Key in principle Small
10 Role of gold Key in practice Negligible
11 Role of US as center Key in principle Small
12 Key members Large, northern OCED/LDC’s, often small
13 Central banks Dependent, unaccountable Independent, accountable
14 Transparency Low High
15 Alignment with academics Worrisome High
But what does it mean to be an inﬂation targeter? The formal requirements seem to consist
of only two: 1) that a target for inﬂation is formally announced; and 2) that the central bank’s
policyinstrumentisadjustedinamannerconsistentwithachievingthetargetoversomehorizon.
This is a very minimalist deﬁnition of inﬂation targeting, and the actual details of how policy is
conducted can vary signiﬁcantly among inﬂation targeters. The key is that the inﬂation target
serves as a nominal anchor (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 2005) and that the target is formally
announced.7
While inﬂation targeting regimes vary, no central bank appears to be a strict targeter, focused
on achieving its inﬂation target regardless of the real consequences. Instead, inﬂation targeters
behave in ways consistent with a concern for both inﬂation and real economic stability, that is,
as so-called ﬂexible inﬂation targeters.
Actually, judging from the recent academic literature, one might conclude that all central banks
are ﬂexible inﬂation targeters. By that I mean that virtually all the modern academic literature
on optimal monetary policy assumes the central bank has instrument independence and oper-
ates to minimize a loss function that calls for stabilizing inﬂation and real economic activity.8












where ¼ is inﬂation, ¼¤ is the inﬂation target (assumed here to be time invariant), and z is a
measure of real economic activity, usually some deﬁnition of an output gap.
7 While inﬂation targeting is widely adopted, Fatás, Mihov, and Rose (2007) suggest that what is critical is having
some quantitative goal (inﬂation, money growth, exchange rate); the exact choice is less important.
8 Financial stability is also frequently identiﬁed as an objective of policy, represented commonly by including a
term in interest rate volatility into the loss function.8 Carl E. Walsh
Because strict inﬂation targeting is identiﬁed with a value of zero for ¸, I will use ¸ as my index
of policy ﬂexibility.9 It is a measure of how important real objectives, in addition to inﬂation,
are in the conduct of monetary policy.
3.1 Where does ¸ come from?
A major criticism of the literature on the average inﬂation bias under discretionary monetary
policy was that the loss function was ad hoc. No deep theory existed to rationalize its use.
Instead, it was justiﬁed primarily on pragmatic grounds. The choice of a quadratic function
in inﬂation and an output gap or unemployment rate gap seemed plausible as a representation
of central bank preferences and was of great analytical convenience.10 But where did ¸ come
from?
The use of ad hoc preferences need not, by itself, be a substantive criticism. Part of the division
of labor within the social sciences is that, by and large, we as economists take preferences as
given, as part of the model environment that we do not try to understand. Understanding the
consequences of preferences is our focus. So one could argue that ad hoc preferences are the
norm in economics, not just in macroeconomics or in monetary policy analysis.
However, while our assumptions about the preferences of individuals may be ad hoc (psychol-
ogists have long criticized the assumptions economists make about preferences), we should at
least be consistent in basing policy objectives on these same preferences. So the real objection
to the quadratic loss function was that it was never connected to the welfare of the individuals
who populate our models.
After ﬁrst discussing the connection between ¸ and welfare, I will touch upon two other inter-
pretations of ¸.
9 Before turning to ¸, however, it is important to point out that the standard loss function is characterized by two
other key aspects in addition to ¸: These are ¼¤, the average inﬂation target, and z, the deﬁnition of real objectives.
The determination of both of these has generated much controversy. I will do no more than list ﬁve considerations
that have dominated the discussions of the optimal average inﬂation target. These have been 1) Friedman’s work
on the optimal quantity of money, 2) the costs of inﬂation in the face of nominal price rigidity, 3) the constraint
imposed by the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates, 4) the use of a target range rather than a point target,
and 5) the price index (e.g., CPI or GDP deﬂator, core or headline, include or exclude asset prices) to use in
deﬁning ¼¤.
Specifying z, the real variable the central bank should stabilize, raises both conceptual problems of deﬁnition and
practical problems of measurement. These issues include 1) the appropriate theoretical deﬁnition of the output
gap, and 2) the statistically measurement of the gap, including the potential consequences of mismeasuring the
gap (Orphanides 2003). The problems of both deﬁnition and measurement can easily lead to policy errors. For
example, consider what can happen if trend productivity growth increases. Standard measures of the output gap
based on empirically estimated trends will not immediately reﬂect this higher trend growth rate, so as actual output
expands, it will appear that a positive output gap has opened. The central bank is likely to engage in policies
designed to slow the economy’s growth. As a result, output will probably not grow as fast as the new, higher trend
growth rate. So the inﬂation-relevant output gap – the gap between output and the ﬂexible-price output – will
actually be negative. The correct policy prescription would be for less contractionary policy.
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which implies the central bank wants to reduce inﬂation volatility and volatility of the true output gap, but it also,
through the ﬁrst term, prefers more output to less.Inﬂation Targeting and the Role of Real Objectives 9
3.2 As a welfare measure
The most interesting insights into the factors that determine the value of ¸ have come from
the line of research on welfare-based optimal policy initiated by Julio Rotemberg and Mike
Woodford (1996). Woodford (2003) derived a second order approximation to the welfare of
the representative agent in a new Keynesian model and showed the conditions under which this
approximationtookaformidenticaltotheadhocquadraticlossfunction. Thegreatcontribution
of this work was to show how the loss function is related to the underlying structural parameters
of the representative agent’s utility function and the parameters that characterized the degree of
nominal price stickiness. The approach also allows for a direct calculation of the welfare costs
of economic ﬂuctuations due to nominal rigidities.
Four interesting consequences follow from this welfare-based approach. First, ¸ depends on the
speciﬁc model of nominal rigidities. Most modern models of nominal stickiness incorporate the
notion of staggered, overlapping adjustment originally developed by Taylor (1980). With indi-
vidual ﬁrms adjusting in a staggered fashion, inﬂation generates a dispersion of prices across
ﬁrms. This dispersion of relative prices is at the core of the efﬁciency loss associated with in-
ﬂation variability. However, how costly inﬂation will be depends on the speciﬁc assumptions
about how individual ﬁrms adjust their prices. For example, with the popular Calvo-type ad-
justment, there will be some prices that have not adjusted for a very long time. This can create
large distortions. As a result, the welfare-based value of ¸ is smaller under the assumption of
Calvo pricing than it is under the assumption of Taylor contracts. Hence, the weight a policy
maker should place on real volatility relative to inﬂation volatility depends on the model one
assumes for price adjustment. It will also depend on whether prices are sticky, whether wages
are sticky, or whether both are.
Second, uncertainty about the correct model of the economy translates into uncertainty about
the correct ¸ to use in trading off the policy maker’s objectives (Levin and Williams 2005,
Walsh 2005b, Edge, Laubach, and Williams 2007). If one doesn’t know whether prices adjust
ala Calvo or ala Taylor, than one doesn’t know how much weight to put on real stabilization
versus inﬂation stabilization.
Third, linking economic structure and welfare can cast light on some key policy parameters,
showing them to depend on aspects of the economy’s structure that would not normally be
thought to be relevant. For example, in a benchmark new Keynesian model, the critical param-
eter that characterizes the central bank’s optimal targeting rule is actually independent of the
degree of nominal rigidity and instead depends on the degree of imperfect competition in the
ﬁnal goods market. It does so because this is what determines the welfare costs of relative price
dispersion that arise with inﬂation volatility.
A fourth implication of the link between welfare and structural models has to do with the role
of policy advisor and policy maker. The traditional separation between the economist who
provides projections of output and inﬂation under alternative policy scenarios and the policy
makers who choose among these based on their preferences breaks down. Not only alternative
models generate different projections, but the way the outcomes should be weighed differs as
well.
At least two potential problems arise in using representative agent models to derive welfare-
based policy objectives and that advise caution in adopting this approach. First, there are sig-
niﬁcant objections to conducting welfare analysis within the context of representative agent10 Carl E. Walsh
models (Kirman 1992). Since individuals do differ, the representative agent is a stand-in for
the aggregate behavior of the individuals in the economy. Even when conditions hold such that
one can aggregate the behavior of the individuals so as to obtain a representative agent, it is
still possible that misleading conclusions about the welfare ranking of outcomes can be drawn.
Examples have been constructed in which the representative agent prefers outcome x to out-
come y even though every individual agent in the economy prefers y to x. Policy based on the
representative agent would attempt to achieve outcome x, thereby making all individuals in the
economy worse off.
Fortunately, it appears that this may not be a signiﬁcant problem for the class of models com-
monly used in macro applications. However, even if the aggregation issue is not a serious
problem, the artiﬁciality of the representative agent as a foundation for welfare-based monetary
policy is particularly apparent in recent new Keynesian models that have incorporated modern
theories of unemployment, including some of my own work (Walsh 2003c, 2005a, Ravenna
and Walsh 2007).11 These papers replace the standard Walrasian model in which all labor ad-
justment occurs on the intensive hours margin with a Mortensen-Pissarides search model of the
labor market in which adjustment can also (or exclusively) occur at the extensive employment
margin. However, in all these models, there is a representative household consisting of both
employed and unemployed members so that there is complete consumption risk sharing. As
a consequence, an unemployed worker suffers no consumption loss. If the so-called Hosios
condition is met, the matching process is efﬁcient and the welfare costs of ﬂuctuations remain
those associated with the inefﬁcient dispersion of prices in the presence of inﬂation.
Ignoring heterogeneity among individuals and the incompleteness of insurance markets is likely
to signiﬁcantly skew the estimates our models provide of the cost of economic ﬂuctuations.
Whether this has important implications for macro policy in general, and monetary policy
speciﬁcally, is less clear. Social insurance policies rather than macro stabilization polices may
be the appropriate response to the absence of the sort of insurance markets commonly assumed
in our models. (Costain and Reiter 2005).
3.3 Other roles for ¸
The welfare of the representative agent provides a basis for thinking about the value of ¸. But
this is not the only perspective for thinking about the weight to place on real objectives. Long
before Woodford’s work, Rogoff (1987) showed how society might prefer a central bank to
place more weight on inﬂation objectives than would be consistent with society’s valuation of
the inﬂation-output gap volatility trade off. Such a central banker would fail to deliver the
optimal stabilization policy, but she would achieve lower average inﬂation. Rogoff’s justly
famous result – that society should appoint conservative central bankers – seemed consistent
with the training and attitudes of many central bankers.
Withthefocusinrecentyearsoncommitmentpoliciesandthelossfunctionasanapproximation
tosocialwelfare, thenotionthatcentralbanksshouldpursue‘distorted’objectiveshaslostfavor.
Yet often the distinction between commitment and discretion in the literature is too sharp. The
establishment of formal institutions such as central banks clearly reﬂects a form of commitment,
but as noted previously, Mervyn King has described policy as ‘constrained discretion.’ And if
11 Arseneau, and Chugh (2006) analyze optimal capital taxation in a labor search model in which the utility of the
unemployed differs from that of the employed, but consumption remains the same across both types.Inﬂation Targeting and the Role of Real Objectives 11
discretion is still relevant, then it is also still relevant to consider whether we really do want
central banks to maximize social welfare.
I want to suggest two additional roles that ¸ can play, both relevant in the face of imperfect or
asymmetric information. One role arises from the need for accountability, the other from the
incentive effects that asymmetric information generates. The distortions created by asymmetric
information and discretionary policy puts us in the world of the third best, and structuring the
central bank’s objectives to differ from social welfare may actually be welfare improving.
3.3.1 As a performance measure
Maximizing social welfare is a difﬁcult task, particularly so since it isn’t something we can
measure. Nor would it be easy even to reach agreement over what it is conceptually. Thus,
while we might want a central bank to conduct policy so as to maximize social welfare, how
would we really know whether it was doing so or not? It is difﬁcult to enforce accountability
when objectives are unobserved.
One factor that clearly does inﬂuence social welfare is inﬂation, and inﬂation is easy to measure.
Inﬂation targeting can be viewed as deﬁning a performance measure under which the central
bank is judged on the basis of inﬂation outcomes. Of course, the problem in any principal-agent
problem in which the agent is judged based on a performance measure that only imperfectly
reﬂects the principal’s true objectives (in this case, social welfare) is that the agent may overly
focus on undertaking actions that make the performance measure look good, even if the actions
are suboptimal from the perspective of achieving the principal’s goals.
This is not a situation unique to monetary policy. In the U.S., there is a tremendous debate
over the quality of educational achievement and teacher quality. At the same time, there is little
agreement over how to measure either. Using student test scores as a performance measure for
schools or teachers is common and these do partially measure educational quality. But their
use risks having schools teach to the test, thereby potentially sacriﬁcing broader, but harder to
measure, educational objectives.
In designing performance measures, the power of the incentive scheme refers to how sensitive
the agent’s reward is to the performance measure. A high-powered scheme is one in which
rewardsareverysensitivetotheperformancemeasure. Atypicalproblemindesigningincentive
schemes is to determine the optimal power – if rewards are linked closely to the performance
measure, the agent will focus too much on the measurable outcomes to the potential detriment
of overall objectives; if rewards are loosely connected to the performance measure, the agent
faces little accountability.
A regime of inﬂation targeting, in which the performance of the central bank is measured by
inﬂation outcomes, can be viewed as establishing an incentive scheme for the central bank. We
know social welfare depends upon more than just inﬂation, and central banks do have effects
on the real economy. But the latter are hard to determine and the welfare consequences of
real ﬂuctuations are not fully understood. We do observe inﬂation; we know it affects social
welfare, and we know the central bank can control average inﬂation. Thus, inﬂation provides a
convenient performance measure against which to judge the central bank.
One can interpret some of the criticisms of inﬂation targeting, particularly in the U.S., where
the Federal Reserve has a dual mandate – price stability and maximum sustainable employment12 Carl E. Walsh
– as reﬂecting a fear that inﬂation targeting causes the central bank to focus exclusively (or at
least excessively) on inﬂation, at the cost of real stability – that it leads the central bank to be
too inﬂexible.
What is the optimal power of the incentive scheme for a central bank, when inﬂation is measur-
able and other objectives may not be? Should the central bank be assigned a low ¸ (so that is
focuses primarily on its inﬂation objective) or a high ¸ (so that it places more weight on non-
inﬂation objectives)? One way to address this question is to imagine a central bank that cares
about social welfare but whose performance is judged in terms of its success in achieving an
inﬂation target (Walsh 2003a). It can be shown that the optimal weight for society to attach to
achieving the inﬂation target – i.e., the power of the incentive scheme – depends on the nature
of the shocks affecting the economy. And it does so in an intuitive manner.
Suppose ﬂuctuations in the economy arise primarily from the demand side. In this case, times
of excessive unemployment are likely to be associated with times in which inﬂation is below
target. So the central bank’s actions to achieve its inﬂation target (an expansionary policy) will
be positively correlated with actions to maximize social welfare – a strict inﬂation targeting
regime is called for. In contrast, in an environment in which cost shocks predominate, there will
frequently be periods in which the central bank’s actions to control inﬂation will conﬂict with
society’s desire for real output stability. In this case, the power of the incentive scheme should
be lower so that the central bank does not overly focus on achieving its inﬂation target.12
Accountability and the role of transparency The need to use inﬂation as a performance
measure rather than social welfare only arises because we cannot measure social welfare. Oth-
erwise, we could just tell central bankers to maximize social welfare and boot them out if they
don’t. But part of holding policy makers accountable requires knowing what they should have
done, and that necessitates knowing what information the central bank had available to it when
it made its policy decisions.
Thus, transparency is critical if independent central banks are to be accountable.
To return to the example of teacher assessment, more complete information on the teacher’s
coursematerials andlessonplans reducestheneedto relyheavilyon testscorestoassess teacher
quality. Similarly, greater transparency reduces the optimal power of the incentive scheme and
increases optimal central bank ﬂexibility.
3.3.2 As a reaction to asymmetric information
As previously discussed, Rogoff’s conservative central bank is a widely known solution for the
average inﬂation bias associated with discretion. In the absence of such a bias, due for example
to the central bank’s choice of the correct output gap target, discretion still produces a bias in
stabilization policy. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) showed that, if the underlying shocks are
serially correlated, this bias would be reduced under a conservative central banker.13
12 This ﬁnding is in accord with the microeconomic literature. Baker (1992) showed that with a risk neutral agent
and a moral hazard problem, the optimal power of the incentive contract is related to the covariance between the
marginal effect of the agent’s effort on the performance measure and the marginal effect of the agent’s effort on
the principal’s objective. If the two are positively and highly correlated, than the optimal contract calls for a high
powered incentive contract.
13 Vestin (2006) and Walsh (2004) explore how assigning the central bank objectives that differ from social wel-
fare can improve over pure discretion by leading to some of the inertia in policy that corresponds to the optimal
commitment policy.Inﬂation Targeting and the Role of Real Objectives 13
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler’s result suggests that, in discretionary policy regimes, there may be a
rationale for appointing central bankers who do not maximize social welfare. I want to pursue
that idea and argue that even in the context of serially uncorrelated shocks (so the Clarida, Galí,
and Gertler result does not apply), it may be welfare improving to distort the central bank’s
objectives. The basic idea is that with asymmetric information, policy actions by the central
bank have both direct and indirect effects. The latter arise from the informational role policy
actions play if the central bank and the public do not share the same information.
Let me illustrate these two effects of policy and how they affect the optimal degree of ﬂexibility
by employing an extremely simple model. Then, I will develop some more speciﬁc results
employing a slightly less simple model.
Consider a standard new Keynesian Phillips Curve of the form
¼t = ¯Et¼t+1 + ·(°)xt + et
where the elasticity of inﬂation with respect to the output gap, ·(°); is a function of °, the
response of policy to cost shocks. The source of this dependence will be derived below, but
the basic intuition is that with asymmetric information, the way policy responds to shocks can
provide information to the public about the central bank’s assessment of the economy, and
thereby affect price setting decisions by ﬁrms.








































Suppose instead the central bank could commit to a simple rule of the form xt = °cet. The
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where " is the elasticity of · with respect to °c. Comparing the expressions for ° and °c, it is
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which will ensure that the same outcomes are obtained as occur under optimal commitment to
a simple rule. Thus, the central bank should put less (more) weight on output stabilization than
society if and only if
" > (<)0
In other words, if responding more strongly (in absolute value) to stabilize inﬂation from cost
shocks increases the output elasticity of inﬂation (i.e., if " > 0), then the central bank should
assign less weight to output stability.
The intuition is straightforward. In this sort of model, loss is decreasing in the parameter I have
called ·. When · is large, smaller real output ﬂuctuations are necessary to stabilize inﬂation.
By responding aggressively to cost shocks, · is increased. But under discretion this effect is
ignored, sothecentralbankdoesnotrespondaggressivelyenoughtocostshocks. Byinstructing
the central bank to focus more on inﬂation stability, policy comes closer to what would be
achieved under commitment to a simple rule.
Of course, I have not yet explained why the output elasticity of inﬂation might depend on how
strongly monetary policy reacts to cost shocks, nor why " might be positive. So let me turn to a
slightly richer model to illustrate why this may be the case.
Publicinformation Iwillbuildonthenotionofpublicversusprivateinformationasanalyzed
by Morris and Shin (2002). They examine an environment in which agents with idiosyncratic
information must forecast a fundamental shock, and they must also forecast what others are
forecasting. Into this environment, common information, such as an announcement by the cen-
tral bank about its forecast of the shock, can have a large impact on what an agent believes about
what other agents are forecasting.14 Agents may overreact to this public information, making
the economy more sensitive to any forecast errors in the central bank’s information. The pos-
sibility of an overreaction to central bank announcements does capture a concern expressed by
some policy makers. For example, in discussing the release of FOMC minutes, Janet Yellen,
President of the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank, expressed the view that “Financial mar-
kets could misinterpret and overreact to the minutes.” (Yellen 2005).15
As is well known, the release of information can lead expectations to become more volatile
(Geraats 2000). Inﬂation volatility may increase with greater transparency. If so, there may
again be a case for a less ﬂexible inﬂation targeting regime in which the central bank places
greater weight on inﬂation stability than maximizing social welfare would call for.
I use a model based on a new Keynesian Phillips curve, but I assume the individual ﬁrms who
are adjusting their price must do so before observing the equilibrium price level or the current
realizations of all shocks.16 Because ﬁrms care about their relative price, they must forecast
what other ﬁrms are doing. I assume the central bank’s instrument setting is observed before
price setting decisions are made. It thus represents one source of public information. I then ask
how announcements about the central bank’s forecasts of inﬂation and the output gap can affect
the weight that should be placed on inﬂation objectives.
14 Woodford (2003) has investigated the role of higher order expectations in inducing persistent adjustments to
monetary shocks in the Lucas-Phelps islands model. See also Hellwig (2002).
15 However, Svensson (2006) has argued that the Morris-Shin result is not a general one. He shows that in their
speciﬁc model welfare is increased by more accurate public information in the Morris-Shin model for all but
unreasonable parameter values. A similar result is found by Hellwig (2004).
16 The model is similar to the one I developed in Walsh (2006).Inﬂation Targeting and the Role of Real Objectives 15
The model The basic model consists of the optimal price setting rule for a ﬁrm that adjusts
its price, a link between policy actions and output, a speciﬁcation of the information available
to individual ﬁrms and the central bank, and an objective that the central bank maximizes under
discretion. Individual ﬁrms have private but noisy information on aggregate cost and demand
shocks, while the central bank has noisy information on these two shocks and on a shock to the
efﬁcient level of output.17
The fundamental informational issues are two. First, private agents cannot fully observe the
information on which policy is based if they only observe the central bank’s policy actions.
Nor can they fully observe the central bank’s information if only the central bank’s inﬂation
forecast is announced; in general, both the instrument and the inﬂation forecast depend on all
three signals the bank received. Second, the Morris-Shin effect arises. Each ﬁrm will use
information provided by the central bank to update its own forecast of the aggregate shocks and
its forecast of what it expects other ﬁrms to do. Because policy actions and announcements
provide information to the public, the central bank’s incentives are affected. Hiking interest
rates because the bank forecasts a positive demand shock may be misinterpreted as a signal the
bank expects a positive cost shock. Because the latter interpretation would cause the public to
revise upwards their expectations about inﬂation, the central bank may react less aggressively
to offset demand shocks.
I consider two policy regimes:
1. No announcements (denoted by o)
2. Full transparency (denoted by f).
For each regime, policy is set under discretion and I consider whether social loss is reduced if
the central bank’s objectives are distorted so as to focus more heavily on its inﬂation goals –
i.e., employing an older terminology, does society beneﬁt from having a conservative central
banker? I let ¿¤
k denote the optimal extra weight on inﬂation in regime k. Optimal here is
deﬁned as the value that maximizes social welfare.
Results While the model does not in general lend itself to a simple analytical solution, it does
so in one interesting case. Suppose ﬁrms have perfect information on the aggregate demand and
cost shocks. In this case, neither the central bank’s policy actions nor its announcements provide
any useful information to the public. Because of this, the central bank does not need to worry
about how its actions are interpreted, or misinterpreted, by the public. It turns out that the best
policy is one in which the central bank does not put extra weight on inﬂation objectives relative
to real stabilization goals, i.e., ¿¤
k = 0. This result is independent of the quality of the central
bank’s information. In that sense, we obtain a type of certainty equivalence that corresponds
to the ﬁndings of Svensson and Woodford (2002) who investigate the case in which the private
sector has perfect and common information while the central bank has imperfect information.
To numerically evaluate the model, standard parameter values of the structural coefﬁcients are
employed. These are ¯ = 0:99, ! = 0:75, · = 1:8, and ¸ = 0:0625 (corresponding to a value of
¸ = 1 if inﬂation is expressed at annual rates). All results are invariant to proportional changes
in the variances of all the shocks, so I normalize by setting ¾2
s and ¾2
v equal to 1. Since welfare
gap shocks are not standard in basic models, I initially set their variance to 0:0005.
17 Details of the model and its structure are set out in an appendix available, upon request.16 Carl E. Walsh
Let me now turn to the effects of information quality on the optimal ¿¤0s and the relative ranking
of the different policy regimes. When private information is imperfect and no longer common
across ﬁrms, Morris-Shin effects arise. Firms must use their own information and the common
information provided by central bank actions and announcements to forecast what other ﬁrms
are going to do. Figure 7 shows loss, relative to full transparency and ¿ = 0, under the al-
ternative policies when °i
j = 0:8 and °i
cb = 0:6. With ¿ = 0 so that the central bank shares
society’s preferences, full transparency dominates. However, a (slightly) lower loss is actually
achieved when the central bank puts more weight on inﬂation stabilization – i.e., it acts as a
Rogoff conservative central banker.
Table 3 reports optimal ﬂexibility for different values of the signal to noise ratios: The optimal
policy is always to be fully transparency, but to place greater weight on achieving the central
bank’s inﬂation objective – transparent under a conservative central banker. As the quality of
the private sector’s information deteriorates, the Morris-Shin effect is at work and private ﬁrms
react strongly to central bank announcements. This effect can be limited if the central bank
focuses primarily on keeping inﬂation stable, i.e., by setting ¿¤ > 0. For a given level of the
quality of private sector information, the same effect is at work as the central bank’s information
improves. This limits the volatility introduced when private agents respond strongly to the
relatively accurate public information




1 o = f 0 0 0
0:8 o 1:75 0:9 0:75
°i
j f 1:40 0:7 0:65
0:6 o 4:05 1:95 1:40
f 4:60 2:35 1:35
Now suppose shocks to the welfare output gap become more important. To be speciﬁc, suppose
their variance is now ¾2
u = 0:5. With three shocks, we can now think of three policies – no an-
nouncements, the announcement of an inﬂation forecast, and full transparency. Figure 8 shows
loss as a function of ¿ under each of these policies. Opaqueness dominates announcements
dominates full transparency.
This simple model illustrates an important fact. In discretionary environments with asymmetric
information, we should not necessarily charge central banks with maximizing social welfare or
with being completely transparent.
3.4 Conclusions
The past twenty-ﬁve years have seen tremendous changes in the practice of monetary policy,
both in the institutional frameworks within which policy is conducted and in the manner in
which it is implemented. While modern central banks are committed to maintaining low and
stableinﬂation, politicalpressures, uncertainty, measurementproblemsofbothaconceptualand
empirical nature, and the lack of formal commitment mechanisms all suggest a reoccurrence of
inﬂation is always possible.Inﬂation Targeting and the Role of Real Objectives 17
Rogoff (1985) long ago showed how, in the presence of a time-inconsistency problem, society
might want the ¸ in the central bank’s loss function to differ from the one appropriate for
social loss. His analysis focused on the need to reduce the average inﬂation bias arising from
discretion. However, even in the absence of such a bias, there are reasons the central bank
might be structured so that the weight it places on output objectives differs from that of society.
I have focused on two reasons – one linked to the need for accountability, one associated with
the role of transparency. Both involve the presence of imperfect information in a discretionary
environment. While the need for accountability calls for transparency, asymmetric information
can affect both optimal transparency and ﬂexibility in ambiguous ways.
Accountability requires some level of transparency so that the success, or failure, of the central
bank can be monitored.18 But an excessive focus on inﬂation objectives can limit the ﬂexibility
of policy in responding to real economic instability. That is the primary objection to formal
inﬂation targeting. Thinking about inﬂation outcomes as a performance measure, one that is
related to social welfare but that provides only an imperfect measure of welfare, provides some
insights into the debate over inﬂation targeting.
Using a simple model of asymmetric information, I found that the desirability of transparency
depended on the nature of the underlying shocks, but whether transparent or not, a conservative
central banker (i.e., one who operates with less ﬂexibility) improved welfare by offsetting some
of the distortion created by asymmetric information.
Of course, while imperfect monitoring and asymmetric information may affect how ﬂexible a
central bank should be, it is important to keep in mind that my discussion presumed that the
most important task of a central bank – providing a nominal anchor – was being met.
18 See Walsh (2003a).18 Carl E. Walsh
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Figure 4:  Change in Inflation, 1970-79 to 1998-2005, Versus Change in Central Bank                                        










 24   Carl E. Walsh 
 








Figure 6: Number of Inflation Targeters (Batini and Laxton 2007) 
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Figure 8: Loss as a Function of τ   with All Three Shocks 
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